This paper establishes the acyclicity of Cournot tâtonnement in a strategic game with aggregation and monotone best responses, under the broadest assumptions on aggregation rules allowing the Huang-Dubey-Haimanko-Zapechelnyuk-Jensen trick to work and with minimal topological restrictions. MSC2010 Classification: 91A10. JEL Classification Number: C 72.
Introduction
The importance of aggregation for the existence of Nash equilibrium was first noticed by Novshek (1985) , see also Kukushkin (1994) . Kukushkin (2004) showed that monotonicity conditions in games with additive aggregation ensure the acyclicity of Cournot tâtonnement rather than the mere existence of an equilibrium. Dubey et al. (2006) , having modified a trick invented by Huang (2002) for different purposes, developed a tool applicable to a broader class of aggregation rules. Kukushkin (2005) and, especially, Jensen (2010) extended its sphere of applicability much further. It looks plausible that the latter paper describes the most general class of aggregation rules for which this approach can still work.
This paper strives to establish the acyclicity of Cournot tâtonnement under the same assumptions on aggregation, but with minimal topological restrictions. The point is that the best response correspondences in the main results of Jensen (2010) were assumed upper hemicontinuous. Although one can plausibly argue that the upper hemiconinuity of the best responses holds in "most" of important economic models, "most" cannot be replaced with "all." Even more importantly, our main theorem implies the existence of an equilibrium where each player uses an arbitrarily fixed monotone selection from the best response correspondence; nothing like that could be derived from the previous literature.
There is an additional reason to look for the weakest possible topological conditions. When viewed as a fixed point theorem, our result occupies a position intermediate between Brouwer's and Tarski's theorems: the former is purely topological; the latter, order-theoretical. In our case, some combination of conditions of both kinds seems indispensable; so it is highly desirable to understand exactly what is needed from either side.
In Section 2, the most basic definitions are given; in Section 3, our (i.e., mostly Jensen's) assumptions, as well as the main theorem, are formulated. Section 4 contains a review of conditions ensuring appropriate monotonicity in strategic games. In Section 5, we briefly discuss alternative aggregation rules for which our main findings do, or do not, hold. Section 6 contains the proof of our main theorem and an example of Cournot dynamics when the best responses are not upper hemicontinuous.
Preliminaries
In the main theorem, we consider exogenously given best response correspondences rather than games as such. An abstract game is defined by a finite set of players N and, for each i ∈ N , a strategy set X i and the best response correspondence R i : X −i → 2 X i \ {∅}, where X −i := ∏ j∈N \{i} X j . We also denote X N := ∏ i∈N X i , the set of strategy profiles.
Remark. The definition of abstract games belongs to Vives (1990) . Under his approach, however, the collection of responses R i was immediately replaced with a single correspondence R : X N → X N , R(x N ) := ∏ i∈N R i (x −i ), to which Tarski's fixed point theorem could be applied. In our case, the structure of a Cartesian product plays a crucial role and is retained to the end.
An equilibrium of an abstract game is
The first basic question about a particular model is whether it admits an equilibrium. In the case of a positive answer, the next question is whether iteration of the best responses leads to equilibria. In this paper, we derive a positive answer to the first question from the same answer to the second one.
We introduce the best response improvement relation on
Every equilibrium is a maximizer of ◃. 
The existence of a Cournot potential is equivalent to the absence of Cournot cycles, i.e., Cournot paths
If X N is finite, this fact implies that every Cournot path, if continued whenever possible, reaches an equilibrium in a finite number of steps. Otherwise, the acyclicity of the best responses does not imply very much by itself. However, if a topological structure is assumed on the strategies and the notion of a Cournot potential is strengthened, conclusions can be drawn, not dissimilar from those in the finite case.
Let X be a metric space. A binary relation ≻ on X is ω-transitive if it is transitive and [
It is essential that (3) implies x ω ≻ x k for all k = 1, . . . as well.
Remark. The property seems to have been considered first by Gillies (1959) , and then by Smith (1974) , for orderings. The term "ω-transitivity" first appeared in Kukushkin (2003) .
Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) implies that an irreflexive and ω-transitive binary relation on a compact set always admits a maximizer. Therefore, the existence of an ω-transitive Cournot potential ensures the existence of an equilibrium. It also ensures the "transfinite convergence" (Kukushkin, 2003 (Kukushkin, , 2010 of all iterations of the best responses to equilibria.
Main result
To derive the existence of an ω-transitive Cournot potential in a class of abstract games, we impose a set of assumptions combining topological and order-theoretical requirements. Quite a number of notations and definitions are needed.
A chain is a linearly ordered set. A partially ordered set (poset) X is chain-complete if every chain ∅ ̸ = C ⊆ X admits both sup C and inf C in X. A poset X is chain-complete downwards (upwards) if only the existence of inf C (sup C) is ensured for every nonempty chain in X. A well ordered set is a chain ∆ such that every subset ∆ ′ ⊆ ∆ contains its minimum. Dually, a * -well ordered set is a chain every subset of which contains its maximum. We assume throughout that a "universal" separable metric space A is given, which is simultaneously a poset. The order on A is consistent with the topology in the sense that:
These conditions imply that all upper sets {y ∈ A | y ≥ x} and all lower sets {y ∈ A | y ≤ x} (x ∈ A) are closed. A good example of such A is R m ; a more general example is the space of continuous functions on a compact space C with point-wise order and the
Both examples are also lattices, which fact comes in handy in Section 4.
Proof. First, we denote
The proof is dual to that of Lemma 3.1. Henceforth, we assume that each X i is a compact subset of the universal set A, and endow X N with, say, the maximum metric. By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, each X i is also chain-complete.
Further, we assume that there are continuous mappings σ i : 
and
for all i ∈ N , x −i ∈ X −i , and x N ∈ X N . Additionally, we assume that each F i has a continuous derivative w.r.t. its first argument,
on [s
Finally, we impose monotonicity assumptions:
Theorem 1. An abstract game satisfying all the above assumptions admits an ω-transitive Cournot potential (hence admits an equilibrium as well).
The proof is deferred to Section 6. Our conditions (6), (7), and (9) are exactly the same as in Jensen (2010) . There was no need for explicit conditions like (4) there since all strategy sets were assumed to be subsets of R m . As to (8), Jensen preferred to consider decreasing best responses; the difference is of no significance since one can always replace σ i with −σ i .
Thus, if we assumed that each R i is upper hemicontinuous, the difference between our Theorem 1 and the main result of Jensen (2010) would be quite minor. However, we do not impose that assumption.
The implications of Theorem 1 for the existence of equilibria in strategic games are considered in the next section. We follow the same logic as in Kukushkin (2005) and Jensen (2010) : each R i may be perceived either as the total best response correspondence or as an increasing selection from it.
Monotonicity conditions in strategic games
The difference between a strategic game and an abstract game is that the best responses in the former model are not exogenous, but generated by the maximization of (ordinal) utility functions u i : X N → R,
for each player i ∈ N and every x −i ∈ X −i . Our Theorem 1 can be applied directly to the best response correspondences in a strategic game if each X i is a compact subset of an appropriate universal set A, while R i 's defined by (10) satisfy all those assumptions. Let there be continuous aggregation rules
for all i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N . For each i ∈ N , we denote S i := σ i (X −i ) ⊂ R, and redefine the best response correspondence:
Our assumption
Remark. In principle, equality (5) may hold for all i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i without (11) holding for all i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N . However, no natural class of strategic games where this happens is known.
Our assumptions on σ i , i.e., (6), (7), and (9), do not depend on whether it is about an abstract game or a strategic game. Jensen (2010) provides quite a list of game models where the assumptions imposed on aggregation rules in Section 3 are satisfied.
As to assumption (8), the well-known studies of monotone comparative statics (Topkis, 1978; Vives, 1990; Milgrom and Shannon, 1994 ) allow us to derive it from assumptions imposed directly on utility functions. We have to start with definitions.
A utility function exhibits the single crossing property (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) if these conditions hold for all i ∈ N , y i , x i ∈ X i , and
Also important are the strict single crossing property (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) :
and the weak single crossing property (Shannon, 1995) :
When strategies are scalar, conditions like (12), (13) or (14) are sufficient for monotone comparative statics results. When X i 's are lattices, some versions of quasisupermodularity (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994 ; see also LiCalzi and Veinott, 1992) are needed too. We reproduce a few of them here.
First, four "quarters" of quasisupermodularity proper:
Then, two "halves" of weak quasisupermodularity:
Remark. Each of conditions (15) and (16) 
Then the best response correspondence R i is increasing in the sense of (8).
If X i is a semilattice, i.e., only the meet y i ∧ x i is guaranteed to exist for every x i , y i ∈ X i (e.g., a budget set), then conditions (15) and (16) make no sense. However, a similar role is played by a condition that could be called semiquasisupermodularity:
Proposition 2. Let, in a strategic game satisfying (11), X i be a semilattice, the strict single crossing condition (13) hold for every x i , y i ∈ X i and s i , s ′ i ∈ S i , and (17) hold for every x i , y i ∈ X i and s i ∈ S i . Then the best response correspondence R i is increasing in the sense of (8).
Proof. Let s
Remark. Undoubtedly, condition (17) is much more demanding than (15) or (16); however, it may hold in a non-trivial way. Essentially, it shows that U i may increase in x i only along a "fixed path."
When the best response correspondences in a strategic game with appropriate aggregation do not satisfy (8), our Theorem 1 may still be applicable in a more sophisticated way. If there are increasing selections from the best response correspondences, we may consider the abstract game defined by those selections rather than total best responses. We cannot obtain any statement about all Cournot dynamics in this way, but the existence of an equilibrium, at least, will be ensured. In the case when those selections are "natural" in one sense or another, the acyclicity of the corresponding dynamics may also be of interest. Finally, the existence of an equilibrium where each player uses a fixed selection from the best response correspondence may be important in some contexts.
Combining Proposition 26 from Kukushkin (2013b) 
is nonempty and chain-complete downwards, Zorn's Lemma implies that R
; we have to show y i ≥ x i . Otherwise, we would have
On other aggregation rules
It is important to note that Theorem 1, i.e., the Huang-Dubey-Haimanko-Zapechelnyuk-Jensen trick, does not cover all nice aggregation rules. For instance, abstract games satisfying (5) and (8) with (Kukushkin, 2003, Theorems 7 and 8) . It goes without saying that the minimum can be replaced with the maximum. Apparently, functions g and F i satisfying (6) and (9) cannot exist in this case. Aggregation rules mapping X −i into chains "longer" than R (lexicographies) may also be nice although there are very few established facts so far. On the other hand, partially ordered aggregates seem hopeless. For instance, additive aggregation makes sense for X i ⊂ R m with m > 1 as well, in which case S i ⊂ R m too. Moreover, in the case of σ i (x −i ) = ∑ j̸ =i x j , condition (8) implies that the best responses are increasing, and hence the existence of equilibria is looked after by the Tarski Theorem (provided the strategy sets remain lattices). Nonetheless, there may be Cournot cycles in such games. 
Condition (8) is obvious; nonetheless, there is no equilibrium.
Proof
For every s i ∈ S i , we defineR i (s i ) : 
in the following equality, if r + i (s i ) and/or r − i (s i ) are not defined, the corresponding term(s) should be ignored:
Step 
Step 6.3. r i is continuous at every
Proof. S i being compact, its complement, [s
consists of the end points of those same intervals. The way we extended r i beyond S i ensures continuity everywhere with the possible exception of the end points and the middle of each interval. By Steps 6.1 and 6.2, r i is continuous wherever r
Therefore, we only have to prove that the set
We pick a countable and dense subset of A and denote it Z.
For every x N ∈ X N , we define a function
In light of Step 6.3, the integral in (18) exists even in the Riemann sense. Let i ∈ N , x N ∈ X N , and
The key role in the Huang-Dubey-Haimanko-Zapechelnyuk-Jensen trick is played by this equality, easily following from (6) and the monotonicity (9) of D i (s i , x i ):
It will be easily derived from (19) 
Not so easy, but also straightforward is the derivation from (19) that H(y N ) > H(x N ) whenever
The most cumbersome part of the whole construction is the definition of the order in the sense of which the current strategy profile goes upwards when
We generally follow Kukushkin (2005) , but additional subtleties are needed because X i 's are no longer chains. This whole part becomes superfluous if every R i is upper hemicontinuous, so R i =R i .
For every i ∈ N , we define binary relations on X i :
(in the following, we say "y i ◃ ◃ i x i holds ats i ");
An i-singular upward chain is a countable well ordered subset ∆ ⊆ X i such that (i)
and there is an i-singular upward chain ∆ ⊆ X i such that y i = max ∆ and x i = min ∆.
An i-singular downward chain is defined dually as a countable * -well
, and (ii)
and there is an i-singular downward chain ∆ ⊆ X i such that y i = min ∆ and x i = max ∆.
Then, we define
Remark. Obviously,
However, y i ◃ ◃ i x i may hold when y i and x i are incomparable in the order on X i . Now, we are ready to define our potential, a binary relation on X N :
Obviously, ≻ is irreflexive. Checking its ω-transitivity and (2) needs quite some effort.
Step 6.4. Both relations ≻ ≻
Proof. It is sufficient to consider one of the relations, say, ≻ ≻
By definition, there are two i-singular upward chains, ∆ ′ and ∆ ′′ , such that min ∆ ′ = x i , max ∆ ′ = y i = min ∆ ′′ , and max ∆ ′′ = z i . Defining ∆ = ∆ ′ ∪ ∆ ′′ , we see that ∆ is an i-singular upward chain -when checking each condition in the definition, we will find ourselves either totally inside ∆ ′ or totally inside ∆ ′′ . Since x i = min ∆ and z i = max ∆, we have
The proof of (3) is quite similar. Let
we again obtain that ∆ is an i-singular upward chain (the condition x ω i = sup k∈N x k i is essential here), x 0 i = min ∆ and x ω i = max ∆.
Step 6.5.
Step 6.6.
Proof. First, if we suppose that z i ◃ ◃ i y i does not hold, then either
In the first case, there is an i-singular upward chain ∆ such that z i = max ∆ and y i = min ∆. Setting
Turning to the second relation, we see that Step 6.5 applies if
Then there is an i-singular upward chain ∆ such that x i = min ∆ and
Step 6.7. The relation ≻ ≻ i is ω-transitive.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Steps 6.6 and 6.4.
Step 6.8. The relation ≻ is irreflexive and ω-transitive.
Proof. The irreflexivity of ≻ is obvious; checking transitivity is very easy. Let us check (3). The
can only happen for a finite number of k; without restricting generality,
since H is continuous, and we are home. Finally, let
In the first case, Step 6.7 applies, producing x ω i ≻ ≻ i x 0 i ; in the second,
Step 6.9.
. If the inclusion is strict, we are home.
Let us assume Invoking (19) separately for x N and y N , we obtain There is a unique Nash equilibrium, (2, 2).
The monotonicity condition (8) Every Cournot path started from x 0 N with x 0 i < 1 for both i converges to x ω N = (1, 1), which is not an equilibrium; H(x k N ) strictly increases at each step. When, say, player 1 makes a best response improvement by replacing x ω 1 = 1 with x ω+1 1 = 3/2, H remains the same, but 3/2 ≻ ≻ + 1 1; hence the strategy profile goes upwards in the sense of ≻ defined by (22) . After that, a unique Cournot path converges to (2, 2), which is an equilibrium; H(x ω+k N ) again strictly increases at each step k > 1. This example demonstrates why Jensen's construction (18) alone is insufficient when the best responses need not be upper hemiconinuous.
Actually, this game admits a simpler Cournot potential, represented by an upper semicontinuous real-valued function P (x N ) := min
It is easy to check that P (y N ) > P (x N ) whenever y N ◃ x N . On the other hand, this simpler potential hinges on specifics of this particular example, whereas (18) and (22) work for every game from the class.
Remark. Kukushkin (2005) contains a more elaborate example where the function H remains constant along a "double infinite" Cournot path (i.e., up to the second limit). Similarly, an example can be produced where all assumptions of Theorem 1 are satisfied, while an arbitrary (countable) transfinite number of best response improvements may be needed to reach an equilibrium, with H being constant all the way. Thus, the behavior of Cournot dynamics when the best responses are not upper hemiconinuous may be much more complicated than in Theorem 2 of Jensen (2010) .
